Afghanistan: Whose war?

The American elite rarely leave their fortified headquarters and go no where without an extensive security escort. They employ, but rarely query, Afghan interpreters and drivers. Foreigners only rarely attempt to learn the native language or culture. If Western executives meet or socialize with Afghans, the latter are most likely to be politicians and businessmen seeking favors.

Not every foreigner acts this way, of course, and even some hardened observers believe Westerners have gotten better at promoting projects actually desired by Afghans. But building roads and schools is at best an imperfect remedy when allied military strikes still kill civilians; allied military raids still humiliate families; allied financial assistance still creates illicit millionaires; and allied military intervention supplants local with central control.

Perhaps the greatest failing of the campaign in Afghanistan is the inability to foster anything approaching a serious local partner in Kabul. Ultimately only Afghans can create a system that survives an allied military withdrawal. Virtually no one believes the Karzai government could stand on its own: the only disagreement is over how long he could hang on and what likely would follow.

This is after more than eight years of war. World War II lasted only six years. World War I ran four years. So did the Civil War. There is little to suggest that U.S. officials have finally gotten it right. If not, how many more lives and how much money is Washington prepared to toss into the Afghan black hole?

Afghanistan is one of the world’s great tragedies. Decades of war have ravaged this once peaceful land. The landscape is still beautiful, yet much of it is poisoned by wars present and haunted by the remains of wars past.

Brutal fundamentalism has replaced liberal tolerance in cities like Kabul. Local self-government today is achieved only at the point of a gun. National self-government remains only a theory. Ambitious Afghans try to emigrate. Wealthy Afghans send their families abroad. Despite it all, many educated and humane Afghans stay, risking their lives fighting for a better life for their fellow countrymen.

To want to help them do so reflects the best of impulses. To believe that one can do it for them reflects the worst of illusions.

America has achieved its objectives in Afghanistan: al-Qaeda has been dispersed, the Taliban has been punished, an anti-terrorism message has been sent. But Washington’s broader attempt at nation-building has been far less successful, despite the expenditure of nearly 1,000 American lives more than $220 billion. For all this, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls the situation in Afghanistan “deteriorating.”

There is no better time than the present for Washington to learn humility. The U.S. cannot impose liberty, prosperity, democracy, and stability on Afghanistan. The Obama administration should focus on protecting Americans from terrorism while leaving nation-building in Afghanistan to the Afghan people.

Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance (www.acdalliance.org), advisor to Campaign for Liberty, and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. He is also a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan.