Here are the reported statistics:
- Of 203 cases reviewed, all but 17 were resolved by agreement.
- Of these, 11 did not involve â€śexplicit religious claimsâ€ť as the reason for refusing medical advice.
- That leaves a mere six cases, one of which culminated with a court ordering life support withdrawn.
- Of the remaining five children (all Christians), four died and one survived with â€śprofound residual neurodisability.â€ť)
In other words, the entire fuss concerns a whopping 3% of all the cases reviewed. And yet, from this bare handful of painful situations, the authors weave a policy argument aimed at undermining the rights of religious parents â€” and only religious parents â€” to make end-of-life decisions about their children when they disagree with â€śsecularâ€ť doctors.
First, the authors argue â€” citing the famous atheism proselytizer Richard Dawkins â€” that a childâ€™s religion should not be considered that of their parents:
Children are currently seen as having a religion by virtue of their parents but it could be argued that children have no religious faith until such time as they are deemed mature enough to make decisions around consent. As Dawkins suggests, should we refer to the child of Christian parents rather than a â€śChristian childâ€ť? We suggest it is time to have a default position in that it is presumed that parental religion is not a determining factor in decision-making for the child until the child is [able] to choose to consent to be part of the parentâ€™s religion.
In other words, the religious aspects of the disagreement should be ignored when the child is too young to â€śconsentâ€ť to accepting his or her parentsâ€™ faith. Yet, their doctorsâ€™ â€” essentially strangers â€” secular values should prevail in such cases even though the child canâ€™t consent to those beliefs either. Talk about cultural hegemony!
Admitting that their argument amounts to â€śreligion being legislated against,â€ť the authors advocate speeding up the procedures for taking dissenting religious parents â€” again, only religious parents â€” before a judge to force withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment over their objections:
â€¦ an accelerated process â€¦ would simply become the default position in religious disagreements on end-of-life management, as it is [in Jehovahâ€™s Witness cases] for refusing consent for transfusion, which could also result in death. The obvious difference being the former is seeking a default position that will result in death whereas the latter is seeking to preserve life.
Thatâ€™s a distinction with a humongous difference! Not only are these blood transfusion cases about preserving life, but time is almost always of the essence in those controversies, thereby justifying fast-track litigation. That is rarely true in disputes over removing life support.
In the end, follow the money:
One further argument for such an approach and one we do not shy away from is the resources used in maintaining children in this setting. While we feel the best interests of the child in question are paramount, the interests of society â€” including other children who might have used this valuable resource â€” cannot be ignored, especially when non-medically indicated painful and futile therapies are continued on children due to an expectation of a miraculous intervention.
So, children of religious parents cost more to care for than those of refusing non-faithful parents who are not targeted for â€śspecialâ€ť treatment? Please. And to be clear, when the authors argue that â€śfutileâ€ť treatments should be withdrawn, they donâ€™t actually mean care that isnâ€™t working. To the contrary, these disputes usually involve withdrawing treatments that are successfully maintaining life when doctors think the time has come for the child to die.
There are certainly circumstances when maintaining a dying childâ€™s life is so egregiously abusive that parental refusal to finally say â€śenoughâ€ť should be overturned by a court. But those are the exceptions, not the rule. In any event, doctors should have the high burden of proof to demonstrate why dead now is better than dead or disabled later. And most certainly, disputes involving religious beliefs should not be treated invidiously or with greater disdain and intolerance than other circumstances in which parents reject a doctorâ€™s end-of-life advice.
Wesley J. Smith is an award-winning author and a senior fellow at the Discovery Instituteâ€™s Center on Human Exceptionalism. He also consults for the Patient Rights Council and the Center on Bioethics and Culture.Â