Al-Qaida still remains a serious threat to the United States, but the nature of the threat has changed, argues terrorism expert Seth Jones.
“I argue that not all al-Qaida affiliates and allies are actively plotting attacks against the U.S. homeland, at least today,” Jones, associate director of Rand Corporation’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, said in an email, speaking of his recent congressional testimony on the subject.
“Still, most of al-Qaida’s affiliates and several of its allies pose a threat to the United States overseas. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, for instance, has planned attacks against U.S. diplomats and infrastructure in Tunis, including the U.S. embassy. As previously noted, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and its allies were involved in the 2012 attack that killed U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens.”
Jones says the type of threat that keeps him up at night is “[a]n attack like the one Najibullah Zazi was plotting before he was captured in 2009.”
“After receiving training from al-Qaida operatives in Pakistan, Zazi, who was an American citizen, plotted to conduct three suicide attacks against three subway cars in New York City,” he said. “It would have succeeded, but the National Security Agency intercepted an e-mail from Zazi to his al-Qaida handler in Pakistan that alerted them to the plot.”
Jones believes it is too early to judge President Obama’s counterterrorism strategy.
“Al-Qaida has been weakened in Pakistan and its affiliates have been struggling in Yemen and Somalia,” he said. “But al-Qaida’s affiliates and allies have grown in North Africa and the Levant. This war is far from over.”
See below TheDC’s full interview with Jones about the threat from al-Qaida, what he thinks America should do in Syria and more:
What is the main point readers should take away from your recent congressional testimony?
First, al-Qaida has been resilient. There has been a net expansion in the number and geographic scope of al-Qaida affiliates and allies over the past decade, indicating that al-Qaida and its brand are far from defeated. This growth is likely caused by several factors. One is the Arab uprisings, which have weakened regimes across North Africa and the Middle East, creating an opportunity for al-Qaida affiliates and allies to secure a foothold.
In addition, the growing sectarian struggle across the Middle East between Sunni and Shi’a actors has increased the resources available to Sunni militant groups, including al-Qaida. Second, this expansion – along with the weakness of central al-Qaida in Pakistan — has created a more diffuse and decentralized movement. Al-Qaida’s local affiliates largely run their operations autonomously, though they still communicate with the core leadership in Pakistan and may seek strategic advice.
Third, within this disparate movement, most al-Qaida affiliates and allies are not actively plotting attacks against the U.S. homeland. In the near term, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) likely presents the most immediate threat to the U.S. homeland, along with inspired networks like the Tsarnaev brothers that perpetrated the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. Other groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusrah in Syria, do not appear to pose a near-term threat to the U.S. homeland. But Jabhat al-Nusrah’s growing recruitment and funding networks in Europe should be a cause of concern for U.S. policymakers.
You say that al-Qaida affiliates and allies have grown since 9/11, but the threat to America from al-Qaida has diminished. How does that work?
I don’t argue that the threat to America from al-Qaida has diminished. Instead, I argue that not all al-Qaida affiliates and allies are actively plotting attacks against the U.S. homeland, at least today. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is focused on overthrowing regimes in North Africa, including Algeria. Al Shabaab’s objectives are largely parochial today, though they could change in the future. Al Shabaab has conducted attacks in Somalia and the region, even though some Americans have fought with al Shabaab in Somalia. And al-Qaida in Iraq and Jahbat al-Nusrah are primarily interested in establishing Islamic emirates in their respective countries, Iraq and Syria, and the region.
Still, most of al-Qaida’s affiliates and several of its allies pose a threat to the United States overseas. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, for instance, has planned attacks against U.S. diplomats and infrastructure in Tunis, including the U.S. embassy. As previously noted, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and its allies were involved in the 2012 attack that killed U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens.
A WMD attack on the U.S. could obviously be catastrophic. Do you believe that al-Qaida and its affiliates still want to land such a blow and, if so, doesn’t the threat from al-Qaida therefore remain grave?
The threat from al-Qaida does remain grave, but it does not appear that al-Qaida has a WMD program. One possible exception is Jabhat al-Nusrah, al-Qaida’s affiliate in Syria, which appears to have a chemical program. In May 2013, Turkish and Iraqi security agencies arrested separate groups of individuals affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra that were attempting to acquire chemical precursors for sarin production.
America’s use of drones has come under some criticism from the left and even some elements of the right. How important are drones in our counterterrorism strategy, both now and in the future?
Drones are a critical part of America’s counterterrorism program — and should remain so for the foreseeable future. The vast majority of drones, such as Predators and Reapers, are used solely for intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance. They play a key role in tracking terrorists and collecting information on their patterns of life. However, a tiny percentage of drones are also used for targeted killing. Some targeted killings, such as those against Ilyas Kashmiri and Abu Ubaydah al-Masri, actively disrupted terrorist plots. But using drones for this kind of activity should be limited, since there is little evidence that targeted killings — by themselves — have ever defeated terrorist groups.
Has the Arab Spring been a net negative or positive in terms of America’s strategic interests?
Overall, the Arab Spring has been a slight net negative. It has weakened regimes in North Africa and the Levant, and provided al-Qaida an opportunity to establish a sanctuary. Although al-Qaida has been weakened along the Afghan-Pakistan border, it has attempted to compensate by expanding its influence elsewhere and establishing relationships with local Sunni groups. In Yemen, for example, the local al-Qaida affiliate has exploited the weakness of the government and established a foothold in several provinces along the Gulf of Aden, triggering alarm in Saudi Arabia.
With U.S. troops gone, al-Qaida in Iraq increased its attacks. Militants from Iraq have also crept across the border into Syria, where they have orchestrated dozens of car bomb and suicide attacks against the Assad regime. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb has dispatched fighters into Mali, Tunisia, and other countries, hoping to take advantage of the political vacuums in North Africa. And al-Qaida has fostered ties with other groups in the region, including Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, and Muhammad Jamal’s network in Egypt.
What threat keeps you up at night?
An attack like the one Najibullah Zazi was plotting before he was captured in 2009. After receiving training from al-Qaida operatives in Pakistan, Zazi, who was an American citizen, plotted to conduct three suicide attacks against three subway cars in New York City. It would have succeeded, but the National Security Agency intercepted an e-mail from Zazi to his al-Qaida handler in Pakistan that alerted them to the plot.
We are over 4.5 years in to Obama’s presidency. How do you rate him in terms of his counterterrorism strategy?
It’s too early to tell. Al-Qaida has been weakened in Pakistan and its affiliates have been struggling in Yemen and Somalia. But al-Qaida’s affiliates and allies have grown in North Africa and the Levant. This war is far from over.
Final question: Do you favor supporting the rebel side in Syria? Do you think it is possible to separate the jihadists from the non-jihadists? Or is that a conflict America should stay out of?
The trends in Syria are alarming. The war is attracting a growing cadre of foreign fighters to groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra that will potentially destabilize Syria for the foreseeable future, spread conflict to the region, and threaten the West. Fighters from al-Qaida-affiliated groups and Hizbullah have fought each other in pitched battles in Syria in such locations as al-Qusayr, with violence spilling over into neighboring Turkey and Lebanon. It is imperative that Western countries and their allies take steps to counter these trends and prevent al-Qaida from establishing a beachhead in Syria.
The United States and Europe need to increase their support to the Syrian Military Council and its battalions, which Jabhat al-Nusra is not directly affiliated with, and accelerate the collapse of the Assad regime. With Russian and Iranian assistance, including from sub-state actors like Hizbullah, the Assad government has hung on far longer than many predicted. At the moment, the West is trying to overthrow the government by simultaneously strengthening some components of the Syrian opposition and weakening others. This is untenable over the long run since groups like Jabhat al-Nusra will likely benefit from a strengthening opposition. While it is important to target Jabhat al-Nusra now to prevent it from gaining strength, it may be easier to sideline groups like Jabhat al-Nusra only after the Assad regime collapses, where their capabilities are no longer needed and where they have substantially different long-term objectives than most of the Syrian opposition. Some groups, like the Ahrar al-Sham Brigades, have already objected to al-Nusra’s long-term goal of establishing an Islamic emirate.
The quicker the regime falls, the better. The West should increase the quantity and scope of support to the Syrian Military Council and its battalions. Outside support can be decisive in an insurgency. In the past, insurgent groups that received external support from states, especially great powers, and enjoyed refuge in a neighboring state won well over half the time. The Syrian opposition has both types of support though it does not have aid in sufficient quantities. The United States and Europe should begin by augmenting the amount and type of aid that is less likely to benefit Jabhat al-Nusra. Examples include providing non-lethal material (such as food, clothing, gasoline, and medicine); offering training from Western special-operations and intelligence units; giving money; and increasing the use of neighboring states such as Turkey and Jordan. In a neighboring state, a group can plot, recruit, proselytize, contact supporters around the world, raise money and — crucially — enjoy a respite from their own government’s counter-insurgency efforts. Training and mentoring are particularly important. US Army Green Berets, for example, are specifically trained to provide assistance to guerrilla fighters and should become increasingly involved in supporting the Syrian Military Council.