The world is finally arriving at much needed consensus on the need to confront the group calling itself the Islamic State (aka ISIS, ISIL and Daesh). But targeted airstrikes, necessary and temporarily effective as they may be, when used alone will ultimately fail. The socio-political factors that have given rise to ISIS need to be addressed.
That’s because even more so than its rigid theological underpinnings, the ISIS phenomenon is an outlier by-product of the deep socio-political fragmentation that has been dangerously smoldering in Iraq and Syria. Religious fundamentalism will, no doubt, play some role in the region for many years to come but this particular group would not have achieved anywhere near their recent, stunning successes without the tacit support that it has received from a significant number Sunni tribes and sympathizers who have been cruelly shut out by the current political systems that respectively exist in Iraq and Syria today.
That’s a shame, because the political situation in Iraq has a relatively easy fix. At the core of Iraq’s problem is a deeply flawed constitution that absurdly relies on the good graces of the ruling political party to accommodate the various groups. In any successful democratic system, the need for consensus must be a more intrinsic part of the constitutional process.
An upper chamber like the U.S. Senate functioning alongside (and in some executive aspects-above) the Iraqi General Assembly may be just what’s needed. With a Senate comprised of nine districts — three in the Shiite South, three in the Sunni triangle, and three in the Kurdish North — and having two senators representing each district, no religious or ethnic group could dominate. With at least ten senators needed to pass any law, the various groups would be forced to work together. This would induce the Sunnis to stay politically engaged in a meaningful way. The Shiites would be assured in knowing that they would still control a plurality of the General Assembly. The Kurds would maintain much of the autonomy they have now while gradually playing a more active and participatory role in Iraq’s internal affairs.
Although we’re long past the point where we can simply redraw the Iraqi constitution, it’s a happy coincidence that Iraq already has a second legislative body that can fulfill the role of ‘senate.’ The Council of Union was created to pay bills with the rest of its powers providently left open for future consideration. It is this body that (with some deft behind the scenes diplomatic wrangling) could tacitly be finessed into to the necessary role just ahead of the quirky amendment process.
The situation in Syria, however, is much more complex. But the possibility of achieving a workable consensus among the Syrians is not as far-fetched as it may first appear. In Damascus and other parts of the country, people on opposite ends of this conflict still conduct necessary business, socially interact, and argue freely about the situation. Some have even switched sides a few times.
The current crisis in Syria began-after all-as part of the greater Arab Spring less than five years ago in which the vast majority of people were yearning for some type of change. The country has been ruled by one family for over 40 years. Bashar al-Assad took over from his father, Hafez, in 2000. The elder Assad had controlled Syria capriciously and with an iron fist since 1971. Even a significant number of people from Assad’s own religious sect, the Alawites, were eager for a respite from the stifling, soul-sucking cronyism that inevitably results from having a long-time leader.
It was only Assad’s extended family, designated business interests, and favored inner circle that wanted a rigid maintenance of the status quo. Assad’s violent reaction to what were at first peaceful, civil demonstrations has turned a proudly secular society into one increasingly revolving around a sectarian conflict between the majority Sunni Muslims and Assad’s minority Alawites. The other minorities such as the Christians, the Druze, the Kurds, and the more mainstream Shiites, have all grudgingly cast their lot with the toxic Assad regime because they rightly feel that they will the victims of an inevitable bloodbath of retribution if it falls.
What we need to do is convince the Alawites and the other minorities that even with Assad and his inner circle gone they will still have a place at the table. This can be accomplished with a proto-constitution — one that ensures that the various groups will have adequate representation in a post-Assad Syria. It would be quite easy to build a model that most Syrians, the Arab League, Turkey and possibly even Iran would recognize as offering a fair representation of Syria.
(But let’s be honest about what we can achieve with regional co-operation, the real power structure in Iran would prefer a situation of permanent instability — the better to increase the influence they are already openly and covertly exerting on the region. Let’s not forget that. But let’s also not let that obstacle stop us from smartly brokering some type of regional agreement on a framework for a post-Assad Syrian government that will be appealing to all parties, with or without Iran.)
The stakes are high. ISIS is a threat unlike anything the modern world has seen. Limited but smartly targeted airstrikes might be a necessary start. But the biggest piece of this puzzle is in addressing the ever-widening political fractures in Iraq and Syria. President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry need to exert every diplomatic and financial means at their disposal to ensure that Iraq changes the structure of its government to one that guarantees, rather than pleads, for inclusiveness. They also need to take the bold initiative of creating a regionally accepted framework for a stable, pluralistic Syria. Defeating ISIS without addressing the political dysfunction from which it has sprung will only insure that another “jayvee” team will quickly rise up in its place.