Opinion

The Ambiguous Future Of The Iranian-Russian Alliance In Syria

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Mohammed al-Sulami Saudi analyst specializing in Iranian studies
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In recent years, Russo-Iranian relations on Syria have ranged from hostility to cooperation, coordination and a tactical alliance. But animosity quickly appeared in the Iranian regime’s responses to Russia’s actions at the first and simplest real test, with Iran rapidly reconsidering its recent lauding of Russia as its closest ally.

With Russian officials currently discussing how best to withdraw foreign forces in Syria to a distance of 70 to80 kilometers from Israel’s southern border, analysts believe that the Iranian leadership is unlikely to find any way to resurrect their former warm relations with Moscow.

There is no doubt Iran will be the biggest loser in Syria, given its massive investment there politically, economically and militarily. All the present events mean that we’re likely to see a rapprochement in the near future between Putin and Trump, which will ultimately force a withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria.

Russo-Iranian alliance set to disintegrate

It seems that the Russo-Iranian alliance in Syria based on the two powers’ shared interests is set to disintegrate as Iran no longer serves Putin’s needs there. The impact of this on the two powers’ other interests is still ambiguous, however. Russian officials’ talk of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Syria has led to a state of confusion among their Iranian counterparts.

Some in the Iranian regime have accused Russia of basing its relations with Iran solely on the basis of serving Russia’s interests, asserting that Moscow has often abandoned Iran when it found its interests were served by alliances with Iran’s adversaries. As an example, one senior Iranian official, Kamal Dahqani Fairuz Abadi, cited Russia’s decision in 1941 to support the decision by the United States and Britain to occupy northern Iran, accusing the current Russian leadership of repeating this policy and reneging on its covenants with Iran due to Moscow’s alliance with Israel.

Abadi, the first deputy chairman of the regime’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said that even if all other countries agreed with Russia’s request that Iran not interfere in Syria’s internal affairs, Tehran would refuse to withdraw. Apparently unaware that he was contradicting himself, Abadi added that Iran has no presence in Syrian territory at the request of the Russian government, therefore it would not withdraw from Syria and would foster security there despite Russian opposition.

Dahqani further accused unspecified European parties of sowing discord between Iran and Russia, alleging that they had encouraged Russia to ask Iran to leave Syria.

Russia’s alliance with Israel

Other Iranian political analysts, including Afshar Soleimani, an international affairs analyst and former Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, suggested that the Russian request was predictable given recent developments, such as the meetings between Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the US’ withdrawal from the nuclear pact, and the recent Israeli attacks on Syrian regime army positions. Soleimani asserted that Russia’s demand for Iranian withdrawal in Syria shows that Moscow is prioritizing its own interests.

While Russian missiles have been crossing the Caspian Sea and Iranian airspace to hit targets inside Syria, many Iranian analysts and veteran diplomats have repeatedly warned that this would earn Iran no benefit, cautioning that Iran should be wary of putting all its political eggs in Russia’s basket and stressing the need to engage with all actors in the Syrian arena.

The current Russo-Iranian tensions have triggered comparisons between Iran’s and the USA’s relations with their respective allies. Soleimani pointed out that, like both China and Russia, the United States maintains full contact with the Arab and European nations and Israel, despite differences and conflicting views on political, economic, security and military issues. Russia’s call on the Assad regime’s allies to withdraw from Syria indicates there is not only clear coordination between Tel Aviv and Moscow, Soleimani added, but also between Russia, the US and Turkey, indicating that these powers seek to increase the domestic and external costs to Iran to put further pressure on the leadership.

For Tehran and the Assad regime, according to some Iranian analysts, a primary concern is Russia’s awareness that any failure to respond favorably to Israel’s demands would greatly increase the risk of a US attack on Russia. Yet any withdrawal of regime-allied forces from southern Syria would reduce the regime’s ability to open a new front, putting further pressure on Assad that could ultimately force him to step down. Soleimani argues that it’s not unlikely that Russia, the US, Israel and Turkey may well be coordinating through various channels of communication to achieve their goals.

Iran’s response to the Russian demands has not been confined to the regime leadership but has also extended to the popular and media arenas. Iranian newspapers demanded that officials obey the will of the people and respond to Russia with the same hostility they express towards American and Western ambitions, oppose Russia’s solidarity with the Israeli regime, and implement an anti-imperialist principle of ‘Neither East nor West’, following the precepts of the founder of the ‘Islamic Republic’, Ayatollah Khomeini, who warned that Russians have historically always reneged on their promises.

Thus, the new downturn in Russo-Iranian relations follows an old historical pattern that many Iranian politicians and analysts had warned of, with distrust of perceived Russian characteristics widespread in Iran. Russia has the upper hand in Syria compared to Iran; while Russia benefits from maintaining a political, economic and military presence in Syria, Iran is being subjected to the harshest political and economic pressures it’s faced in many years, both domestically and internationally. With a divergence in the strategic objectives of the two erstwhile allies on their strategic objectives in Syria, it seems the pragmatic alliance, in this arena at least, may not last much longer.

Saudi columnist Mohammed al-Sulami is the head of International Institute for Iranian Studies and he has a Ph.D. in the field of Iranian studies. He tweets: @mohalsulami.


The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of The Daily Caller.