Given the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan,
a definitive, conventional “victory” is not a
realistic option. Denying a sanctuary to terrorists
who seek to attack the United States does not
require Washington to pacify the entire country,
eradicate its opium fields, or sustain a long-term
military presence in Central Asia. From the sky,
U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles can monitor villages,
training camps, and insurgent compounds.
On the ground, the United States can retain a
small number of covert operatives for intelligence
gathering and discrete operations against specific
targets, as well as an additional small group of
advisers to train Afghan police and military forces.
The United States should withdraw most of its
forces from Afghanistan within the next 12 to 18
months and treat al Qaeda’s presence in the
region as a chronic, but manageable, problem.
Washington needs to narrow its objectives to
three critical tasks:
Security. Support, rather than supplant, indigenous
security efforts by training and assisting
the Afghan national army and police and, where
appropriate, paying off or otherwise co-opting
regional militias. Training should be tied to clear
metrics. If those benchmarks are not achieved,
Washington must cut its losses and cease further
assistance. U.S. forces should not become Afghanistan’s
perpetual crutch.
Intelligence and Regional Relations. Sustain
intelligence operations in the region through aerial
surveillance, covert operations, and ongoing
intelligence-sharing with the Afghan and Pakistani
governments. Seek cordial relations with all of Afghanistan’s
neighbors, particularly Russia and
Iran, as each has the means to significantly undermine
or facilitate progress in the country.
Drugs. Dial back an opium eradication policy
to one that solely targets drug cartels affiliated
with insurgents rather than one that targets all
traffickers, including poor local farmers. Harassing
the latter alienates a significant portion of the rural
population.
Central Asia holds little intrinsic strategic value
to the United States, and America’s security will
not be endangered even if an oppressive regime
takes over a contiguous fraction of Afghan territory.
America’s objective has been to neutralize the
parties responsible for the atrocities committed
on 9/11. The United States should not go beyond
that objective by combating a regional insurgency
or drifting into an open-ended occupation and
nation-building mission.
Most important, Afghanistan serves as the
crossroads of Central Asia. From its invasion by
Genghis Khan and his two-million strong Mongol
hordes to the superpower proxy war between
the United States and the Soviet Union, Afghanistan’s
trade routes and land-locked position in
the middle of the region have for centuries rendered
it vulnerable to invasion by external powers.
Although Afghanistan has endured successive
waves of Persian, Greek, Arab, Turk, Mongol,
British, and Soviet invaders, no occupying power
has ever successfully conquered it. There’s a reason
why it has been described as the “graveyard of
empires,” and unless America scales down its
objectives, it risks meeting a similar fate.
Given the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan,
a definitive, conventional “victory” is not a
realistic option. Denying a sanctuary to terrorists
who seek to attack the United States does not
require Washington to pacify the entire country,
eradicate its opium fields, or sustain a long-term
military presence in Central Asia. From the sky,
U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles can monitor villages,
training camps, and insurgent compounds.
On the ground, the United States can retain a
small number of covert operatives for intelligence
gathering and discrete operations against specific
targets, as well as an additional small group of
advisers to train Afghan police and military forces.
The United States should withdraw most of its
forces from Afghanistan within the next 12 to 18
months and treat al Qaeda’s presence in the
region as a chronic, but manageable, problem.
Washington needs to narrow its objectives to
three critical tasks:
Security. Support, rather than supplant, indigenous
security efforts by training and assisting
the Afghan national army and police and, where
appropriate, paying off or otherwise co-opting
regional militias. Training should be tied to clear
metrics. If those benchmarks are not achieved,
Washington must cut its losses and cease further
assistance. U.S. forces should not become Afghanistan’s
perpetual crutch.
Intelligence and Regional Relations. Sustain
intelligence operations in the region through aerial
surveillance, covert operations, and ongoing
intelligence-sharing with the Afghan and Pakistani
governments. Seek cordial relations with all of Afghanistan’s
neighbors, particularly Russia and
Iran, as each has the means to significantly undermine
or facilitate progress in the country.
Drugs. Dial back an opium eradication policy
to one that solely targets drug cartels affiliated
with insurgents rather than one that targets all
traffickers, including poor local farmers. Harassing
the latter alienates a significant portion of the rural
population.
Central Asia holds little intrinsic strategic value
to the United States, and America’s security will
not be endangered even if an oppressive regime
takes over a contiguous fraction of Afghan territory.
America’s objective has been to neutralize the
parties responsible for the atrocities committed
on 9/11. The United States should not go beyond
that objective by combating a regional insurgency
or drifting into an open-ended occupation and
nation-building mission.
Most important, Afghanistan serves as the
crossroads of Central Asia. From its invasion by
Genghis Khan and his two-million strong Mongol
hordes to the superpower proxy war between
the United States and the Soviet Union, Afghanistan’s
trade routes and land-locked position in
the middle of the region have for centuries rendered
it vulnerable to invasion by external powers.
Although Afghanistan has endured successive
waves of Persian, Greek, Arab, Turk, Mongol,
British, and Soviet invaders, no occupying power
has ever successfully conquered it. There’s a reason
why it has been described as the “graveyard of
empires,” and unless America scales down its
objectives, it risks meeting a similar fate.
Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, is the author of 8 and the editor of 10 books on international affairs. His most recent book is Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America.