Is the North Korean nuclear issue a deadly cancer with no cure? Is expecting the Kim Jong-un regime to repent and give up on its nuclear programs like a climbing a tree to catch a fish? Judging on the regime’s track record, the answer to these questions, regrettably, is yes. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted seven resolutions including the latest UNSCR 2356, sanctioning North Korea to condemn its five nuclear tests and numerous missile launches since 2006, but the regime has not even budged. Indeed, the hermit kingdom’s high-stakes game of chicken with the world is still ongoing. Its nuclear arsenal has become an uncontrollable, ticking time bomb that forces not only the Korean peninsula but also the Northeast Asian region and the international community to face an insoluble dilemma. In other words, the North’s nuclear capability is a tenacious, asymmetrical threat that undermines the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) at the global level, pits the United States against China and fans the flames of the New Cold War at the regional level, and holds South Korea’s survivor and prosperity hostage at the national level.
The DPRK, in its effort to carry out nuclear development, has predominantly focused on advancing delivery vehicles in 2016 and 2017. In fact, the regime conducted 24 missile launches in 2016 alone, and ten missile launches have been added to the list during the first half of 2017. Such flurry of launches indicates that Pyongyang has diversified the type of missiles in use, method and target of launches and made strong strides in its missile programs. In the case of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), for example, the North conducted a land-based static ejection test in October, 2014, and fired the missile from a sea-based launch platform on January 23 and April 22, 2015. On May 8, in the same year, the regime carried out its very first underwater test-fire of a SLBM dubbed the KN-11. The missile flew a mere 200 meters above the water, only showing the regime’s cold launching capability. In 2016, the North had its first success in showing both cold and hot launching on the April 23 test, which was followed by a firing of a SLBM on August 24 that flew a distance of 500 km. The August 24 test clearly demonstrated that North Korea’s missile technology had advanced enough to deploy SLBMs to battle lines.
The DPRK has also been obsessed with the development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM). North Korea, from April 15 to October 15 and 20, 2016, conducted eight Musudan missile launches. The missile launched on June 22 was fired at an almost vertical angle, and it traveled 400 km, reaching an apogee of 1,413 km. Its 3,000 km-plus range at a normal trajectory could extend all the way to the United States military bases in Asia, but the June 22 test was carried out at a lofted trajectory to display its capability to hit the metropolitan area in South Korea and stop the United States augmentation forces from coming into the Korean peninsula. When a missile is fired at a steep angle, the flight range is shortened, but the terminal-phase velocity is increased. Therefore, if missiles fired from the North descend at such high speed, the PAC-2’s success rate will inevitably suffer. In short, Pyongyang is demonstrating its means to overwhelm Seoul’s anti-missile defense system, wreak havoc on the capital area and attack the South’s port cities of Busan and Pohang, entry points of the United States military reinforcements.
On February 12, 2017, the DPRK announced that the KN-15, a solid-fueled, medium-range strategic weapon, was successfully test-fired. Experts in Seoul suspected that the newly developed missile is a land-based variant of the KN-11 fired in 2016 with the maximum flight range of 2,400 km. The Hwasong-12, Pyongyang’s new missile launched on May 14, 2017, was fired at a near 90-degree angle, and it flew 787 km with an apogee of 2,111 km. Pundits stated that if the missile were flown on a standard trajectory of 35 to 40 degrees, it could cover a maximum distance of 5,000 km. They added that Pyongyang could create an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the East Coast of the United States by multiplying the engine used for the Hwasong-12 and combining them to power a single missile. Shortly after the launch of the Hawsong-12, Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, warned Washington by stating that “If the United States awkwardly attempts to provoke the DPRK, it will not escape from the biggest disaster in the history. The United States should not disregard or misjudge the reality that its mainland and Pacific operation region are in the DPRK’s sighting range for strike and that it has all powerful means for retaliatory strike.”
The North’s unprecedented level of missile launches indicates new advancements in its missile programs. Indeed, the regime’s missiles are being diversified from liquid-fueled, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles to solid-fueled, cruise, submarine-launched and surface-to-ship missiles. The mobility, accuracy, flight range of the missiles are also being rapidly enhanced. In addition, the DPRK is close to perfect the re-entry technology, essential to developing an ICBM. The reclusive regime’s ultimate goal is to attach diversified, lighter and standardized nuclear warheads to delivery vehicles, thereby being accepted as an invincible nuclear power on the global stage.
North Korea watchers, observing the DPRK’s nuclear and missile developments, are throwing many questions including but not limited to the following: How long should the international community let the Kim Jong-un regime play the game of chicken, holding the people of the two Koreas hostage? How long should we throw the reins to this disgraced pariah state with nothing but nuclear arsenal and bellicosity as its authoritarian regime threatens the regional and global peace and stability? How could we lead the North to denuclearization when it has no regards to multiple UNSCRs, the Trump administration’s maximum pressure and engagement policy and China’s half-hearted effort to dissuade the regime from advancing its nuclear capability? One thing is certain: no one knows when this game of chicken will come to an end. That said, we all know how the game will end. Pyongyang with a population of 25 million and a GDP per capita of $1,800 will not win its reckless gamble against the entire world. The DPRK must come to its senses and face the fact that it can never win this foolish game it is playing. Now is high time for the regime to move toward denuclearization and away from provocations.