As we approach the third month of the Gaza War and the third year of the Ukraine War, key similarities in how the Biden administration approaches these conflicts have become increasingly clear.
The first similarity is the failure to deter the assaults. In Ukraine, the failure of the West to deter Russia’s attacks in both 2014 and 2022, and unconscionable delays in providing the entire spectrum of advanced weaponry beginning in 2014, constitute the original sin. And Russia is at least as well placed as the West to plan for a multi-year conflict. The fracturing of support for Ukraine within the Republican Party and a newly energized wokeness in the Democratic Party bode ill for continuing high levels of American support. NATO’s defense industrial base is inadequate to Ukraine’s needs. And if the United States does less, Europe will indulge its usual pacifist inclinations and send in its diplomats.
In the Middle East, a policy of appeasing Iran and failing to even acknowledge its role in creating, funding, and managing multiple terrorist groups dooms the United States to fighting – or ignoring – brush fires until they become conflagrations. The United States has given Iran no reason to fear expanding its proxy wars. Iran enjoys “escalation dominance” and can choose the time and place of its next challenge, whether the West Bank, the Lebanese border, Syria, the Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, a Sunni Arab monarchy, or even a terrorist strike on a Western target. The major U.S. naval deployments currently on station have a tightly constrained mission: the only kinetic use has been defensive engagement of missiles and drones launched by Houthi forces without targeting the launchers.
The second similarity is the quarter- and half-measure American responses in each case. Robust rhetoric and active but ineffectual diplomacy masked arms aid cautiously rationed to avoid inordinately feared escalation. Mr. Putin’s occasional hints at nuclear use have effectively taken advantage of Russia’s ten-to-one advantage in theater nuclear forces. Russia has successfully intimidated the U.S. from permitting the modest weaponry that it has provided from being used to target even strictly military facilities in Russia.
Similarly, the United States has taken no discernible steps to punish or even threaten Hamas for killing at least 31 Americans and taking an uncertain number of American hostages. Hamas will no doubt retain these most important chips for months or years absent billions in what it would label reparations or American concessions in the Middle East. More effectively targeting Hamas’s estimated billion dollars a year financial empire will require major pressure, particularly on Turkey and Qatar.
The administration is now embarking on a third stage in which our embattled allies will be increasingly pressed to negotiate a settlement that will leave the aggressor with the option of resuming its attacks in a year or three. The first element of a response must be a credible threat of direct U.S. military action. Statements from American spokesmen have had a pleading tone lacking mention of consequences.
Toward Russia, the United States should undertake and publicize rotational deployments of small numbers of strategic bombers to Poland or the Baltic states and a similar forward deployment of nuclear capable naval forces to the Baltic or Norwegian Seas. The Biden administration has commendably undertaken comparable deployments to the Pacific to bolster deterrence against North Korea (and, not incidentally, China). The United States should undertake discussions in NATO looking toward rebuilding theater nuclear forces, coupled with an offer to refrain from doing so should Russia reduce its theater nuclear forces to NATO levels. This is, of course, a reprise of the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) dual track strategy initiated by the Carter administration and carried to fruition by the Reagan administration, which led to the global elimination of INF missiles.
Toward Iran, there must be a sea-change in U.S. policy: Iran must be held directly accountable for its proxies. A serious strategy would inform Iran that multiple targets are at risk including those within its borders. This message should accompany a robust series of strikes on those proxies which have repeatedly and with little consequence targeted American forces in Iraq and Syria with at least 90 attacks since October 17 resulting in at least 45 injuries to American forces. The Navy must reinforce its traditional mission of ensuring security for the global commons. The Navy has belatedly begun talks with allies on a multinational force to protect shipping in the Red Sea. Congress must take control of economic policy on Iran to prohibit the release of frozen funds and require enforcement of oil sanctions currently being ignored by the administration. The U.S. should provide Israel an aerial tanker capability to go with the recently approved “bunker busting” bombs.
American policy on both Ukraine and Gaza has reflected the hyper cautious and political mindset of key Biden national security officials who reflect thinking with a time horizon not extending past 2024 and a short-term tactical approach reflecting the personal staff positions which several of them occupied for decades. These policy makers were selected to provide an aging president a level of comfort and are not individuals of independent accomplishment or stature.
It is increasingly clear that the administration is seeking a negotiated settlement for Ukraine. The administration is hammering Israel to work out a ceasefire in Gaza that will enable Biden to declare peace in our time (however briefly) and ease political divisions within the Democratic Party. American pressure on Israel is increasing on a daily basis. Israel is instructed to limit targets in southern Gaza which its leadership and citizenry are absolutely committed to destroy. Limits on use of firepower to satisfy American qualms have almost certainly increased Israeli casualties and may prolong the war. Reliable administration mouthpieces instruct Israel to change its leadership. Aid packages for both countries are being delayed due to congressional disfunction and the administration’s domestic agenda.
Yet there are some grounds for optimism. Strong majorities of Americans of both parties approve sustained U.S. support for both Ukraine and Israel, though by declining margins. The citizens of Ukraine and Israel remain committed. A world in which Putin wins in Ukraine would inexorably threaten central European NATO allies the U.S. is treaty bound to defend. A premature ceasefire in Gaza would encourage Iran to move on other fronts. The vital goals, shared by the United States and democracies everywhere, have not changed.
Destroy Hamas and eject Russia. No other outcome is acceptable.
Gordon Bare is a retired U.S. Army and State Department officer.
The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Daily Caller.