“Extra” is essential in the case of F-35 jet engines

“… distractions and mischaracterizations cloak substantive arguments surrounding the issue as the second engine is not “extra;” it’s an alternate, and the enormous difference between the two words means everything.”

Common sense tells us that the result of any competitive bidding process is a better product, lower price and often an alternative source in case the wheels fall off the primary widget.

Last Tuesday the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee voted to continue funding what has become a controversial second engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to be made by General Electric and Rolls Royce to reinforce a primary Pratt & Whitney engine.  The decision to continue this multi-vendor competition now rests with the Senate.

But despite strong recommendations for the second engine from the House and the independent Government Accounting Office, President Obama believes one-stop engine shopping for a single-engine fighter plane is a prudent plan.

The story has been covered extensively in the media – from the wrong perspective.  Instead of a debate about multiple-source purchasing in procuring critical components for warfighters, stories have focused on the juicy bits  – competing lobbyists, “pay to play” accusations and advertising budgets.

Public relations efforts by both vendors have been hard-hitting, and considering the circumstances – expected, as both are ultimately accountable to shareholders and employees.  But are the messages accurate?

A recent story covered a Pratt & Whitney poll included questions so slanted that using it as a legitimate public relations tool bordered on ridiculous.  For example, respondents overwhelmingly said “no” when asked if the Pentagon should spend money on an “extra” engine.  Phrased like that, who wouldn’t?

The pollster concluded that supporting competition for an alternative engine would jeopardize electability in the fall.  The JSF engine dispute that few people outside Washington ever heard of replaces jobs as the key driver of voter choice in November.  Really?

These distractions and mischaracterizations cloak substantive arguments surrounding the issue as the second engine is not “extra;” it’s an alternate, and the enormous difference between the two words means everything.

The March 2010 GAO report on the JSF made it clear that both our security and our taxpayers would benefit from engine competition.  It noted that if administered properly — by a Pentagon that has embraced a Total Quality Management and Six Sigma approach to contract management — a competitive engine program would save money.

Millions have already been spent on the GE/RR engine and it will cost an estimated $63B to complete the JSF.  Continued competition for two engines will cost about $5B (only 8% of the remaining budget.)  A savings of as little as 10% from the competitive process could negate the additional expenditure in as few as four years.