Leading global political risk consultant Ian Bremmer says that although the world is rapidly changing, the United States remains in the best position to lead the 21st century.
“If you had to bet on one nation, it would be absolutely foolish to bet against the United States,” he said.
“That said,” he added, “we are very unlikely to return to some form of single super power world. Other countries may not become America’s equal for the foreseeable future, but that doesn’t mean we’re headed back to 1960,” when the Cold War was raging.
Bremmer, president of the Eurasian Group, explains his vision of this changing world in his new book, “Every Nation For Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World,” to be released on Tuesday.
“[F]orget the G7 and the G20,” Bremmer told TheDC. “We’re entering a G-Zero world — one where a lack of global-level leadership will keep old problems simmering and trigger new ones. The G-Zero can’t last, because it’s liable to create problems that demand a coordinated response. It’s a period of transition, but one that’s likely to be with us for awhile.”
Bremmer said he wrote the book because the “current debate on the state of the world has become too ideological and too polarizing.”
“On the one hand, many folks seem convinced that America is in some kind of irreversible decline and that China is fast taking over the world,” he said. “On the other, there are too many folks talking about the financial crisis and slow recovery as if they’re just a speed bump on the road back to business as usual. The challenges we face are a lot broader and more complicated than either of those two cartoon versions of reality would suggest. They’re also more immediate.”
Read the full interview with Bremmer on what comes after the G-Zero world, what America needs to do to remain atop the world stage and other aspects of his book:
What do you mean by a “G-Zero” world?
For many years, the decisions that mattered most for international politics and the global economy were made by Americans, Western Europeans and the Japanese. This was the G7 world. The financial crisis made clear that the G7 had become an anachronism — that you can no longer expect to solve serious problems without help from deep-pocketed developing world players like China, India, Gulf Arabs, Brazil, etc. But the G20, the forum where established and emerging heavyweights are supposed to come together to take on the big issues, will only produce results when everyone around the table is threatened by the same problem at the same time and to more or less the same degree. That will happen in only the most extreme circumstances. Big differences of opinion within the G20 about democracy and market capitalism add to the dysfunction.
Today, despite the fact that America will remain the world’s most powerful and influential country for the foreseeable future, there is no single country or credible alliance of countries with the resources and the will to drive an international agenda. America, Europe and Japan are too busy with big problems at home to accept their traditional burdens abroad. The lead emerging players are not ready for prime time. Their development challenges are still too demanding for big global risk taking.
So forget the G7 and the G20. We’re entering a G-Zero world — one where a lack of global-level leadership will keep old problems simmering and trigger new ones. The G-Zero can’t last, because it’s liable to create problems that demand a coordinated response. It’s a period of transition, but one that’s likely to be with us for awhile.
You write that the G-Zero world cannot last. What comes next?
That will depend on the answer to two questions: Will the U.S.-Chinese relationship be defined mainly by competition or by largely compatible interests? Will these two countries dominate international politics or can a variety of other states play an independent and influential global role? In the book, I lay out five basic scenarios that follow from the answers to these two questions:
• A G2 world in which common interests lead U.S. and Chinese leaders mainly to collaborate.
• A workable G20 order in which the G-Zero has generated so much trouble that governments are forced to work together to ensure political and economic stability.
• A “Cold War 2.0” scenario in which the new order is defined by U.S.-Chinese conflict.
• Regionalization of international politics, in which America remains the only global power but in which local heavyweights call most of the shots within their respective neighborhoods.
• A disintegration scenario that I call “G-Subzero” in which fragmentation within powerful countries limits the ability of national governments to govern.
Fortunately, that last scenario is highly unlikely. The world that follows the G-Zero will probably be some combination of a couple of these different models, but regionalization appears the likeliest result because it’s the path we’re already on
Why do you assume that America will have to adopt a more “cost-sensitive approach to foreign and defense policy?” The great long-term driver of American debt — by far — is America’s long-term liabilities from its entitlement programs. Wouldn’t serious reform of its long-term liabilities be a game changer and make the need for a drastic shift in defense policy essentially unnecessary?
Yes, a grand bargain on entitlement programs would be a game changer. But there are two important caveats here. One, that bargain would likely include some long-term defense cuts too. Second, and more to the point, I see little reason for optimism that we’ll see that kind of grand bargain any time soon, in part because the turmoil generated by G-Zero is likely to persuade international investors to seek safety in the dollar. That will give U.S. policymakers more rope, which I’m afraid they’ll use to hang themselves.
In other words, we probably won’t see Democrats and Republicans agree on something big until a frightening crisis forces them to, and G-Zero-related volatility elsewhere will probably bolster the dollar in the near term, postponing that day of reckoning until a lot more damage is done. In addition, an international policeman needs leverage. If the super power is to get the results it wants, the world must believe it can sustain a long-term troop presence in a hostile environment. As U.S. soldiers return home from Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s liable to be quite some time before the U.S. public will tolerate another long-term troop commitment.
You write that the American public is demanding a more “sharply reduced U.S. role in the world than at any time since the attack on Pearl Harbor?” Yet recent polls show that a majority of Americans favor a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities if necessary to prevent the Islamic Republic from obtaining an atomic bomb, and in the GOP primary, the least hawkish candidate, Ron Paul, has no prospect of winning the nomination while the second least hawkish candidate, Jon Huntsman, was forced out of the race due to lack of support. Is it possible that you overstate the desire of Americans for a reduced role in the world?
This is one of those polls where the result depends entirely on phrasing of the question. Ask an American if he favors an airstrike if it’s the only way to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, and you’ll get answer A. Ask the same American whether he prefers “sanctions” or “military action” and you’ll probably get answer B. There are many polls out there on Iran and its nuclear program, with a wide range of results.
One of the polls I cite in the book goes broader than this: A survey of “long-range foreign policy priorities” conducted by the Pew Research Center in May 2011 found that the only goals winning majority support were protection of jobs, protection of the United States from terrorist attacks and reduction of U.S. dependence on imported energy. The percentage of those who favored “reducing the U.S. military commitment overseas” climbed from 26 percent in September 2001 to 46 percent in May 2011. “Promoting democracy abroad” won support from just 13 percent of respondents, and nearly half said that the United States “should mind its own business internationally.”
Polls on these issues ebb and flow, but there’s no denying that the United States is on the back end of two of the longest-lasting troop commitments in U.S. history. A combination of war fatigue and a ballooning deficit will depress public demand for an activist super power foreign policy for the next several years.
Will any nation emerge to lead the 21st century? What nation do you think is in the best position to do so?
If you had to bet on one nation, it would be absolutely foolish to bet against the United States. As I wrote in the book, anyone who believes that American decline is inevitable has chosen to ignore the entire history of the United States and its people. Start with America’s longer-term strengths. Free market capitalism has been generating prosperity through cycles of boom and bust for hundreds of years. Chinese-style state capitalism doesn’t have that kind of track record, and creative destruction is a source of risk, not dynamism, for this system. America’s higher education, the durability of its democracy, its culture of innovation and entrepreneurialism, its relatively strong demographics and a dozen other factors work in the country’s favor.
Now consider the alternatives. Europe will be busy restoring confidence in the single currency — and perhaps the single market — for years to come. If things go badly, the entire European project could be in question. I’m generally bullish on Europe’s future, but the challenges it faces are complicated and will take time to address. As for the next wave of powers, some of these emerging players will fully emerge and some won’t. China is particularly unpredictable. It must extend a development path which its leaders admit is “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable.” The tasks ahead are unprecedented, and China is the country least likely to develop along a straight path.
That said, we are very unlikely to return to some form of single super power world. Other countries may not become America’s equal for the foreseeable future, but that doesn’t mean we’re headed back to 1960.
What three policies should America adopt to ensure that it remains the leading power in the 21st century?
Winners are willing and able to set aside vanity, learn from mistakes, adapt to changing circumstances, innovate where possible, partner where necessary and play to core strengths. This is what U.S. policymakers have to do to rebuild the nation’s strength from within so that America is in a stronger position to lead in the post-G-Zero world.
First, Americans must have faith in the country’s core strengths. Democracy and free market capitalism have delivered the country through many a dark hour. Emerging stronger from the G-Zero will demand flexible, far-sighted approaches to issues like energy security, cyber-threats, nuclear proliferation, terrorism and a dozen other problems — and it will require Washington to maximize its strength by partnering with the right potential allies on each of these issues.
And though I’m skeptical for the near term, I certainly hope that U.S. policymakers can bolster the nation’s security by sharply reducing its debt burden. No reform that fails to trim the fat from America’s sacred cows can accomplish this goal. Deficits do matter, compromise is a virtue and even a super power must live within its means. Until long-term confidence is restored, America can’t truly rebuild its core strength.
Finally, Americans and their leaders must do something they haven’t been good at for a long time: invest in the future. There’s nothing inevitable about a U.S. revival. If too many lawmakers hold to the idea that the political needs of the moment can always trump long-term investment, that fidelity to party orthodoxy is an absolute good, and that compromise amounts to a failure of will, we can expect lasting damage to America’s political self confidence and economic dynamism.