The sequester will be good for the economy

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Jeffrey Miron
Senior Lecturer, Harvard University
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      Jeffrey Miron

      Jeffrey A. Miron is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and the Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Department of Economics at Harvard University. His area of expertise is the economics of libertarianism, with particular emphasis on the economics of illegal drugs. Miron has served on the faculty at the University of Michigan and as a visiting professor at the Sloan School of Management, M.I.T. and the Department of Economics, Harvard University. From 1992-1998, he was chairman of the Department of Economics at Boston University. He is the author of Drug War Crimes: The Consequences of Prohibition and The Economics of Seasonal Cycles, in addition to numerous opeds and journal articles. He has been the recipient of an Olin Fellowship from the National Bureau of Economic Research, an Earhart Foundation Fellowship, and a Sloan Foundation Faculty Research Fellowship. Miron received a B.A., magna cum laude, from Swarthmore College in 1979 and a Ph.D. in economics from M.I.T. in 1984.

Politicians, pundits and economists are all forecasting horrific impacts on the U.S. economy as sequestration hits Friday. The basis for this view is the standard — Keynesian — claim that spending cuts slow economic growth, perhaps even causing a recession.

This claim is false.

The Keynesian model of business cycles is taught in most college and high school economics courses around the world. It is accepted wisdom in the halls of government. But its value as a guide for policy depends on a key but under-emphasized assumption.

The Keynesian model does not evaluate government expenditure using the standard microeconomic concept of economic efficiency (cost-benefit analysis). Instead, the model assumes policy should target increased GDP. This sounds reasonable, and consistent with efficiency considerations, until one examines government expenditure in detail.

This expenditure has two components: purchases of goods and services (e.g., roads, education, research, and the military) and transfer payments (e.g., unemployment insurance, welfare, food stamps, Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security).

The efficiency concern with government purchases is that the National Income and Product Accounts value them as equal to the expenditure on these items. This means that bridges-to-nowhere or a military buildup aimed at an imaginary alien invasion are both desirable from the Keynesian perspective because such expenditures increase measured GDP. Yet this expenditure is pure waste.

More broadly, the fact that some government expenditure generates benefits in excess of costs (the economy needs some roads) does not mean additional expenditure generates value in excess of costs (the economy does not need to re-pave its roads every year). At some point additional expenditures hit diminishing returns and make no sense in cost-benefit terms.

Transfer payments are also problematic from an efficiency perspective because they distort economic incentives. Unemployment insurance discourages work effort. Social Security subsidizes early retirement for people who are still able-bodied. Medicare and Medicaid create moral hazard, thereby generating excess health costs. Thus even if transfers help stimulate consumer spending, their net effect on the economy is unclear.

This implies that whether the sequester will harm or help the economy depends on whether cost-benefit considerations can justify the existing level of government expenditure. And on this question, the answer is clear. Across all categories, federal expenditure is far greater than necessary to achieve the legitimate goals of government intervention.