The recent death of Navy SEAL Charles Keating after Islamic State terrorists burst through Kurdish defenses exposes a serious flaw in the US military’s anti-ISIL campaign that leaves our soldiers unsafe: the needless exclusion of thousands of Iraq’s non-Muslim soldiers from our counter-ISIL campaign.
The attack occurred northwest of ISIL’s stronghold of Mosul in an area known as Nineveh Plain, home to the ancient Assyrian Christian community. Their main force, the Nineveh Plain Protection Units, counts thousands of recruits, but only 300 are mobilized due to lack of support from Baghdad. Even though the Assyrian force is legally integrated into Iraq defense apparatus, and therefore eligible for U.S. military aid, U.S. Commanders favor counting on Kurdish forces to hold the battle line around Mosul. But these are not Kurdish lands and their lack of familiarity with the terrain and increasing local hostility towards them makes this approach a tactical liability that risks further American lives.
The rare good news is that the legal basis for directly extending U.S. military aid to the Assyrians and nearby Yezidis is already in place. The 2016 National Defense Authorization Act funding the multi-billion Iraq Train and Equip Fund commits the U.S. Government to provide defense articles, services, and related training to “Kurdish and tribal security forces and other local security forces.” The NDAA’s Joint Explanatory Statement defines local security forces as those “committed to protecting highly vulnerable ethnic and religious minority communities, such as Yezidis, Christian, Assyrian and Turkmen.”
After much delay U.S. military aid is finally reaching the Kurds and Sunni tribesmen. That is progress. But our military will not include Iraq’s minorities despite their concentration around Mosul and obvious tactical military value to Iraqi and Coalition forces planning ISIL’s final death knell. This policy makes no sense. General Najim Al Jibouri, the Iraqi commander of the Mosul operation, complains that “I have limited forces” and claims he needs thousands more to succeed.
Meanwhile, thousands of strategically located Assyrians and Yazidis are ready to take back their ancient lands, but lack basic supplies, arms, and training that a cash-strapped Iraqi government is unable to provide. In contrast, thousands of well-armed, pro-Iranian Shia militia, not particularly known for their religious tolerance, are poised to “liberate” Mosul on their own. This is a recipe for disaster.
Congress should demand that the Pentagon immediately train and equip Iraq’s minorities as the NDAA allows. A U.S. training camp recently opened in nearby Makhmour military base, so there is no logistical excuse. Furthermore, it would be a concrete follow on to previous Congressional calls on the administration to declare ISIL guilty of carrying out genocide against Iraq’s religious minorities, but which has seen no subsequent action since it did so on March 17th.
But it is in post-ISIL political stability that extension of U.S. military aid to Iraq’s minorities finds it most persuasive argument. Neither Baghdad nor Washington, DC has provided clear plans for redressing the deep sectarian grievances the day after ISIL is defeated. For many in the West tired of seemingly intractable Middle East conflicts partition along ethnic lines has become a quick fix. In Iraq, where no one agrees where those ethnic boundaries lie, partition would actually spark a Hobbesian war of all against all.
Others call for the Kurds to serve as American proxy ground forces to destroy ISIL, but ignore the explosive issue of internal territorial disputes between Kurds and Arabs that, to date, are barely suppressed by a common foe. Only last week dozens were killed in a Kurdish-Shia militia firefight. In addition, neither Yezidis nor Christians are apt to forget how the Kurds forcibly disarmed them before the ISIL onslaught, contributing to their demise. In terms of extinguishing Christianity in Iraq, what ISIL started, a three-way Sunni, Shia, Kurdish civil war would complete.
With Baghdad currently in political free fall, Iraqi media reports that Kurdish Regional Government President Masoud Barzani now wants minority lands north of Mosul incorporated into a Greater Kurdistan in exchange for his help to liberate Mosul. That is certain to stoke further sectarian conflict. Direct U.S. military aid to the region’s minorities can act as a political palliative by signaling a “hands-off” message to any party seeking to resolve boundary disputes by force at the existential expense of Yazidis, Assyrians and other minorities.
While in Baghdad recently I found Iraqi officials open to the idea of extending U.S. military aid to minority forces near Mosul as long as they operate within the national chain of command. Hence, there is no Iraqi opposition either. In fact, Baghdad sees a unified Iraqi military force composed of all of its constituent peoples as an ameliorative glue to solidify post-war national cohesion. They correctly view U.S. military aid as a major driver of post-war national reconciliation. But time is running out as the administration wants to liberate Mosul soon before presidential elections this fall.
In sum, the case for immediately extending U.S. military assistance to Iraq’s minority forces is justified by the gravity of ISIL’s genocidal campaign, its strengthening of Iraq’s military capacity to defeat ISIL, and as a political crucible for catalyzing a post-ISIL Iraq that is inclusive, stable and peaceful.
Max Primorac served on the White House Task Force for Protection of Religious Minorities in Iraq under President George Bush and was the State Department’s Senior Adviser on Stabilization and Transition.
